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Abstract This paper considers problems arising from contract enforcement and the atten-
dant possibility of voluntary default. Loan contracts in the informal sector are rarely explicitly
recorded and enforced by formal legal institutions. Repayments may be induced via informal
enforcement mechanisms based on social sanctions through linked relations in repeated inter-
actions. Lenders tend to use the strength these (bilateral) relations, called social capital, as a
device for rationing heterogeneous borrowers. We apply the existing notion of exogenous so-
cial capital and introduce the notion of endogenous social capital. Appropriates level of social
capital may promote loans that otherwise would not be granted. For small loans though, the
endogenous social capital may become negative. We nd that in such cases borrowers may
be encouraged to take up excessive loans to increase incentives for repaying. The theoretical
analysis is supported by empirical observations, mainly from China.
Keywords: Self-enforcing Contract, Social Capital, Credit Constraints, Informal Credit.
JEL Classi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1. Introduction
Informal nance is an essential feature of credit markets in developing and poor regions of
emerging economies as, e.g. in China.4 However, those engaged in informal nance are un-
likely to seek legal enforcement of their activities because they are illegal in the rst place.5
How about legal activities? As an American lawyer observed, `contracts in China have more
of a sense of moral obligation than absolute rights. There is no concept that they are bind-
ing'.6 Social capital in community networks promotes interpersonal trust, provides better
1We are indebted to David Dickinson, Jayasri Dutta and Herakles Polemarchakis for thoughtful comments
and suggestions in the Applied Economics and Policy Research Group at The University of Birmingham and to
Colin Rowat for helpful comments on a previous version of this paper. Wei Liu gratefully acknowledges nancial
support from the Department of Economics of The University of Birmingham and The Great Britain-China
Educational Trust. The authors are responsible of all remaining errors.
2Corresponding author. Address for correspondence: Statistics Development Section, Statistics Division,
United Nations Economics and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacic, Bangkok 10200, Thailand. Email:
liuw@un.org
3Department of Economics, Kingston University, Kingston-upon-Thames, Surrey KT1 2EE, United King-
dom. Email: w.spanjers@kingston.ac.uk
4See Allen, Qian and Qian (2002,[3]).
5See McMillan (1997,[41]) and Tsai (2002,[53]).
6See McMillan (1997,[41]).
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opportunities to punish deviants, and serves as a hedging substitute for institutional and legal
deciencies.7 Hence, there exist eective informal nancing channels and governance mecha-
nisms, such as those based on reputation and relationships, to promote investment and thereby
to support economic growth.8
Another feature of credit markets in China is that private entrepreneurs or rms, especially
small rms, are credit constrained. These rms are willing to pay the current interest rate but
cannot obtain funds at that rate because lenders are unwilling to lend to them. This normally
happens in formal nancial institutions. Evidence shown in the sample of the World Bank's
survey in China, i.e. IFC (2000,[35]), indicates that private rms may then be forced to
limit their investment to retained earnings. In the informal credit market, entrepreneurs with
better political and social ties (guanxi) will incur lower transaction costs and experience less
uncertainty in institutionalising their nancing arrangements.9 10
Due to the possibility of default and lack of eective contract enforcement mechanisms,
lenders have additional incentives to restrict the supply of credit (credit rationing), even if
they have more than enough funds to meet a given demand and the borrower is willing to pay
a high enough interest rate.11 12
The credit constraint is one of the central concepts in this paper. The term credit rationing
is often used interchangeable with constrained credit, but they express two dierent concepts,
as indicated in Figure 1. Credit rationing occurs because there is a dierence between what
a lender is willing to lend and would be able to lend. This dierence is at the discretion of
the lender.13 Nevertheless, whether or not a borrower ends up being credit constrained also
depends on his optimal demand for credit. We refer to borrowers as unconstrained in the
7See Bian (2001,[12]), McMillan and Woodru (1999,[42]) and Xin and Pearce (1996,[58]).
8See Allen, Qian and Qian (2002,[3]).
9See Tsai (2002,[53], p.161).
10Tsai (2002,[53], p.19) points out that local male business owners with strong political ties, for example,
are more likely to tap the more highly institutionalized nancing mechanisms than are migrant women who
operate businesses at a similar scale in the same locality. Dierent entrepreneurs tap dierent forms of informal
nance because they rely on dierent interpersonal dynamics to create the level of predictability and `credible
commitment' those formal nancial institutions and sophisticated property rights would theoretically require.
11See Allen (1983,[2]).
12In the context of this analysis, asymmetric information problems as in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981,[50]) are not
overly important because contracts are not enforceable by court or other formal institutions in the rst place.
13This concept of credit rationing includes the case in which identical borrowers are treated dierently,
putting some at a disadvantage compared to others. This is sometimes used as an alternative denition of
credit rationing.
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credit market when they either do not wish to obtain external funds or when they were able
to obtain a loan of optimal size. Those that apply for a loan and are refused and those that
do not apply because they expect to be refused, are considered to be constrained.
| {z }
| {z }




Figure 1: Credit Rationing and Credit Contraint
Developing countries and transitional economies often have weak legal institutions for
the enforcement of contractual commitments. Where legal institutions are weak, bilateral
relationships, such as social ties and reputation, can substitute for the courts in supporting
contracting.14 Thus, lenders tend to use these bilateral relations, called social capital, as a
device for rationing heterogeneous borrowers.15 As discussed in Section 3, our focus on micro-
level social capital sets this paper apart from Guiso et.al. (2004,[33]), who focus on social
capital on the macro-institutional level.
In the discussion below, we address the following questions. How exactly does `social
capital' work as an eective enforcing mechanism? How well can an alternative mechanism
replace formal systems? What are the eects of social capital on the credit constraint problem
of the borrowers?
These questions motivate the present paper as it revisits enforcement issues with particular
reference to China. The overall argument is that social capital supplements the usual criteria
in investment decisions. The relative immobility of the borrower in social interactions, that
is required for the use of `punishment strategies' in innitely repeated interactions, may be
reasonably applicable to the type of environment in which non-market institutions ourish.16
14See McMillan and Woodru (2002,[43]).
15Another device the lenders could normally choose is loan size.
16In this spirit, DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999,[20]) investigate empirically whether homeownership increases
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The core idea of the possible enhancing eects of social capital is that the presence of par-
ticular direct (e.g., prior professional relationship, or interpersonal friendship) and indirect
(e.g., third party referral) ties between lenders and borrowers will positively aect investment
selection decisions of lenders, and therefore, may tend to solve the credit constraint problem
of borrowers.17
Our model emphasizes the design of an incentive compatible contract in an innitely re-
peated game to ensure borrowers have an incentive to repay their loans. In that sense, this
research is related to the literature that studies repeated borrower-lender interactions in which
the threat of termination of the relationship by the lender provides incentives for the borrower
to repay.18 We depart from this literature by emphasizing the eects of social capital on con-
straints in credit markets. In particular, social capital is not clearly modelled in those previous
papers. Nevertheless, many studies reveal that the small-rm sector is highly organized and
regulated through informal rules shaped by social capital.19 Empirical evidence shows the im-
portant role of social capital not only in China,20 but also in other developing and transitional
economies.21 For example, De Soto (1989,[18]) documents that membership in social groups
is crucial for access to many economic opportunities in the informal sector in Lima, Peru.
Consequently, `It takes a fair amount of time and resources to establish and cultivate a wide
network of friends, `uncles', and `cousins'. . . '.22 Hence, social capital is costly to maintain
and needs to be understood in a more rigorous approach.
Social capital and trust are integrated within an economic framework in Spagnolo (1999,[49]).
He denes the concept of social capital in the context of an innitely repeated game and oers
investment in local amenities and social capital and nd that indeed it does, especially because it reduces
individual mobility. See also Fafchamps (1992,[23]).
17The model is related to the literature that analyses the eects of informal nance in developing countries. A
growing microeconomic literature, see Morduch (1999,[44]), especially in the area of the micro-nance, assesses
the mechanisms (group lending, dynamic incentives, etc.) underlying the advantages of traditional informal
credit institutions. See for instance Banerjee, Besley and Guinnane (1994,[7]) for credit cooperatives, McMillan
and Woodru (1999,[42]) for trade credit in Vietnam, and also Ghatak and Guinnane (1999,[30]), Ghatak
(2000,[31]), Armendariz de Aghion (1999a,[5], 1999b,[6]) and Laont and N'Guessan (1999,[39]) for group
lending.
18See e.g. Allen (1981,[1], 1983,[2]), Dutta and Kapur (2002,[22]) and Bolton and Scharfstein (1990,[13]).
19See Jagannathan (1987,[38]).
20See Allen, Qian and Qian (2002,[3]), Batjargal and Liu (2002,[9]), Bian (2001,[12]), Ivory (1994,[36]),
Lin (2001,[40]), Rauch and Trindade (2002,[48]), Tsai (2002,[53]), Tsui and Farh (1997,[54]), Xin and Pearce
(1996,[58]) and Yeung and Tung (1996,[59]).
21See Besley and Coate (1995,[11]), De Soto (1989,[18]), Fafchamps (1992,[23]), Ferrara (2003,[25]), Fukuyama
(1992a,[26], 1995b,[27]), Greif (1989,[32]), Helliwell (1996,[34]), McMillan and Woodru (1999,[42], 2002,[43]).
22See De Soto (1989,[18], p. 166).
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the following mechanism. Each period two players face two stage games: an economic game
and a social game. They must choose between cooperating and defecting in both of the games.
Spagnolo argues that even if the incentive compatibility constraint in the economic game is
violated, the additional payo from the social game can make up the `decit' in the economic
game, so that players may choose to cooperate in both games. Enforcement problems in the
credit market have not been analysed in his framework, although some scattered pieces of
evidence suggests that they are signicant.23 The purpose of this paper is to provide a theo-
retical analysis to explore how a variable that represents social capital may t into the formal
theory, and what types of questions it may be able to answer. Above all, our model not only
explains the existence of constrained credit as consequences of an enforcement problem, but
also discusses the possibility that the credit constraint problem is mitigated or even disappears
because of the role of social capital. We extend Spagnolo's framework, which relies on exoge-
nously given levels of social capital, by allowing the level of social capital to be determined
endogenously, increasing with the loan size. For suciently small loans the level of social
capital becomes negative, thus reducing the borrower's incentive to repay. As a consequence,
small borrowers may be forced to take excessive loans.
Section 2 describes the set-up of the model. It species the credit market without reference
to social capital. Section 3 conceptualises social capital as a specic form of governance.
Following Section 3, Sections 4 and 5 analyse the associated repeated game. In Section 4
a model with exogenous social capital is analysed, whereas Section 5 introduces endogenous
social capital. Finally, we conclude in Section 6 with a summary and a discussion of our
results. Proofs of the two main propositions are gathered in the Appendix.
2. The Model
The basic feature of informal nance captured in the following analysis is that the repayment of
a loan is not enforceable by law or by a third party. The key problem that we focus on is why,
how, and in what contexts, social capital increases the size of loans and thus investments. We
also try to shed some light on the mechanism through which social capital generates the trust
23See Allen (1981,[1], 1983,[2]).
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needed for nancial transactions. More specically, we address the following three questions:
1. What is the role of social capital on the level of investment in the credit-constrained
market.
2. How does social capital aect the incentives to repay informal loans.
3. What single variable captures social capital and how may it t into the formal theory?
What insights can be derived from it?
We use a simple model to investigate these questions, in order to focus the results.
Generally speaking, borrowers may fail to repay lenders for three reasons. The rst is that
the risky project fails and borrowers do not have the nancial capacity to repay.24 The second
reason is that the cash ow of the project is not observable by the lender unless the lender
undertakes an audit.25 Finally, as an extreme version of this, repayment of a loan may be
impossible to enforce by laws or other formal institutions. Therefore, even if the borrower
has the nancial capacity, he may fail to have an incentive to repay the lender.26 Borrowers
default if the costs of non-repayment are less than the loan and interest payment combined
(i.e. so called strategic default). Borrowers repay when incentives are present to do so.
Throughout this paper, we focus solely on strategic default. We ignore the possibility that
borrowers have insucient funds to repay their loan. The model can easily be extended to deal
with default of this kind but this additional complication yields little extra insights. Thus, it
is assumed that borrowers run riskless projects.
The model that we consider is one of an innitely repeated game. We adapt Allen (1983,[2])
by making the following assumptions. We assume that the borrower takes the interest rate set
by the lender as given. He chooses the size of the informal loan to maximise his prots for the
given interest rate, taking into account the relevant constraints. For simplicity, borrowers are
taken to have no initial wealth of their own. A borrower makes an investment funded by an
informal loan of size I provided by a lender. The size of the loans can dier and is determined
24See Stiglitz and Weiss (1981,[50]).
25This so called costly state verication, was modelled rigorously by Choe (1998,[15]), Diamond (1984,[19]),
Gale and Hellwig (1985,[29]), and Townsend (1979,[52]).
26Jaee and Russell (1976,[37]).
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by the interaction between the lender and the borrower. The lender has an opportunity cost
for her funds of zero (a real interest rate of zero is exogenously given by a nancial authority).
She charges a real interest rate r on her loans in the informal credit market.
Each period, the borrower has a riskless project that requires investing capital and lasts for
the whole period. As the borrower has no capital of his own, he depends on a loan from one
of many competing lenders to nance the project at the prevailing interest rate. The timing
of the events in each period is as follows.
At beginning of each period, the borrower and the lender agree on a loan contract. At
t = 0, the borrower applies for a loan of size I to start his project. If the lender provides
a loan to the borrower, then she will charge the exogenously given real interest rate r > 0
independent of its size. If the lender does not grant the loan, she obtains zero prot.
At t = 1, the output Y = f(I) is realised by the borrower. The production function f(I)
has the usual properties: f 0(I) > 0; f 00(I) < 0; f 0(0) = 1 and f 0(1) = 0. The borrower has
access to this production technology but the lender has not. Since the project of the borrower
is riskless, we may focus on the case that the output f(I) is sucient to repay the loan with
interest (1 + r)I. Each period the borrower withdraws his prots and can not continue the
project if the lender denies him a new loan.
Since the loan is informal, the lender cannot rely on courts to enforce the contract, even if
she can verify the level of output. The borrower knows this and decides whether to repay in
full. He is able to repudiate his debt, but in this case he cannot obtain any further loans. We
disregard issues related to renegotiation of the debt.27 The borrower's repayment decision will
hinge on comparing the gain from having the additional income of (1 + r)I (the consequence
of default), with the gain from continuing the project. Time is discrete and the interaction
between the lender and the borrower is innitely repeated.
The timing of the interaction is represented in the following table.
Table 1: Timing of the Interaction.
27For this issue, see e.g. Fender and Sinclair (2000,[24]).
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Time Revenue Repayment New Loan
t = 0 0 0 I0
t = 1 f(I0) (1 + r0)I0 I1
t = 2 f(I1) (1 + r1)I1 I2
etc.
For now we focus on the economic interaction between the borrower and the lender, disre-
garding their social interaction and its payos.28 Given the set-up of the model, the prot of
the borrower at time t is dened as
t(It 1; rt 1) := ft(It 1)  (1 + rt 1)It 1
where ft(It 1) is total output and (1 + rt 1)It 1 indicates the total repayment. In order to
simplify the analysis, we assume that the exogenous variables (including the wealth of the
borrower) remain constant over time, i.e. that the associated game is stationary. This allows
us to drop the subscript t in our notation.
The borrower's demand for capital ID when he repays the loan is obtained by solving the




The corresponding rst order condition is
@(I; r)
@I
= f 0(I)  (1 + r) = 0:
Therefore, the borrower's optimal loan size is obtained from:
f 0(ID) = (1 + r):
From our assumptions it follows that (ID; r)  0, i.e. the borrower is capable of repayment
of a loan of optimal size.
The borrower knows that when he defaults he will not be able to gain access to the credit
market (and therefore to produce) in the future. When the informal loan is repaid, the lender
is willing to grant another informal loan.29 At the moment of repayment, the discounted
28We will discuss later what happens when the lender and the borrower interact in both an `economic' and
a `social' relationship.
29The implicit assumption is that the information about the borrower's credit history is reliable and free, and
circulates in the market without friction. In the context of informal loans, the reliability of information may at
times be compromised.
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t 1 [f(I)  (1 + r)I] = 1
1   [f(I)  (1 + r)I] (1)
where future payos are discounted by the factor 0 <  < 1:
As the informal loan contract cannot be enforced, the borrower must have incentives to
repay. Repayment is supported if:
E(I)  f(I); (2)
i.e. the incentive compatibility constraint (IC) for the borrower is satised.30 That is, the
discounted present value of the earnings stream that can be realized from future transactions
exceeds the one-time wealth increase obtained from breaching the current agreement. The left
hand side (LHS) of (2) denotes the discounted income stream for the borrower if he repays now
and in each future period. The right hand side (RHS) of (2) is his income when he defaults.
Thus, inequality (2) is the general expression of the incentive compatibility constraint for the
borrower to repay.
Combined, equation (1) and inequality (2) lead to the following optimal repayment decision
of the borrower:
Repay whenever f(I)  1 + r

I:
The resulting decision problem of the borrower is depicted in Figure 2.
The intersection of the straight line `0(I) :=
1+r
 I and the concave production function
f(I) denes the maximal informal loan I^ that satises the incentive compatibility constraint
expressed in inequality (2). The lender will only grant loans within the interval [0; I^(; r)].
The cut-o point I^ is the maximum that the lender is willing to lend. If the borrower's
unconstrained demand ID exceeds I^(; r), then his credit is constrained. We now state under
which condition the optimal demand ID is higher than the cut-o point I^.
Proposition 1. For each r  0 there exists a unique discount factor 0 < ^(r) < 1 such that
for any  < ^(r) the borrower faces a binding credit constraint.
30This assumes that the strategy of the lender in the repeated game is to provide a new loan if the borrower
honoured his past obligations and the new loan satises the incentive compatibility constraint.






































Figure 2: Credit Contraint without Social Capital
Proof: See Appendix.
Proposition 2. If the discount factor  approaches zero, then the maximum the lender is
willing to lend approaches zero as well.
Proposition 2 is illustrated by Figure 2. As can be seen, the intersection I^ of the line `0(I)
and the concave production function f(I) will approach the origin when  approaches zero
and, as a consequence, the slope of `0(I) approaches innity.
Example 1: Consider the production function f(I) := A
p
I. For this production function







so I^(; r) := A
22
(1+r)2
. The unconstrained optimal loan size ID follows from the rst order
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For ^ = 12 , the maximal incentive compatible loan size equals the unconstrained optimal loan
size, i.e. I^ = ID. Thus, if the borrower is suciently impatient, i.e.  2 (0; 12); then his credit
is constrained.
As @I^(;r)@ > 0 and
@I^(;r)
@r < 0, our example indicates that the two factors that aect
the maximal loan size I^, viz. the interest rate r and the discount factor , work in dierent
directions. In particular, an increase in the interest rate decreases the cut-o value I^ of informal
loans and, consequently, the credit constraint becomes stricter. Hence, our example illustrates
the possible negative eects of increases in the real interest on the supply of informal credit.
3. An Economic Approach to Social Capital
What is social capital? 31 The debate on social capital has brought together sociologists, an-
thropologists, political scientists and economists. While dierences remain, there is agreement
that, in contrast to all other concepts of capital central to the development debate, social
capital is unique in that it is relational.
`Whereas economic capital is in people's bank accounts and human capital is
inside their heads, social capital inheres in the structure of their relationships. To
possess social capital, a person must be related to others, and it is these others,
not himself or herself, who are the actual source of his or her advantage'. 32
The broad denition of social capital from Turner (1999,[55], p. 95) refers to
`those forces that increase the potential for economic development in a society
by creating and sustaining social relations and patterns of social organization'.
These forces operate at macro- and micro-levels of analysis. That is, social capital is formed
31Coleman (1999,[17]) denes social capital by its function. It is not a single entity but a variety of
dierent entities, with two elements in common: they all consist of some aspect of social structures, and
they facilitate certain actions of actors { whether persons or corporate actors { within the structure of re-
lations between actors and among actors. For alternative denitions of social capital see, e.g. Bowles and
Gintis (2002,[14]), Fukuyama (2000,[28]), Ostrom (1999,[45]), and Putnam (1993,[47]). The World Bank
has an excellent web site with an entire electronic library on the subject, see social capital home page,
http://www.worldbank.org/poverty/scapital/index.htm.
32See Portes (1998,[46], p. 7).
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(a) as a population becomes organised to meet basic and fundamental needs for production,
reproduction, regulation and coordination (the macro-institutional level); and
(b) as social encounters in the form of face-to-face interaction unfold within corporate and
categorical units (the micro-level).
Whereas the paper by Guiso et.al. (2004,[33]) on social capital and nancial development
in Italy focuses on the macro-institutional level, we follow the micro-level approach. People's
interaction with each other will normally be embedded in two environments: multiplex re-
lations and simplex relations. In a multiplex relation, persons are linked in more than one
context (neighbour, fellow worker, fellow parent, co-religionist, etc.), while in a simplex rela-
tion, persons are linked through only one of these relations. The central feature of multiplex
relations is that it allows the resources of one relationship to be appropriated for use in others.
Sometimes, the resource is merely information, as when two parents who see each other as
neighbours exchange information about their teenagers' activities; sometimes, it is the obliga-
tions that one person owes the second in one relationship, which the second person can use to
constrain the actions of the rst in the other relationship. Often, it is resources in the form of
other persons who have obligations in one context that can be called on to aid when one has
problems in another context.
In order to formulate these ideas in a formal approach, Spagnolo (1999,[49]) denes a
concept of social capital by distinguishing between economic and social interaction. The
essential idea is that two persons face each other in two contexts: economic interaction and
social interaction. In modern societies, the two interactions are not necessarily linked: business
is business and family is family. However, in developing countries, where business and family
often cannot be separated, linked interactions are crucial to help us understand the credit
market. A deviation in one context could lead to subsequent punishment in both contexts.
For example, if a borrower does not repay, he could be punished by the lender not only by
termination of future loans, but also by the lender as his uncle, neighbour, close friend, and so
on. We follow the denition of social capital from Spagnolo, but extend it to include negative
social capital:
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Denition 1. Social capital is the (possibly negative) surplus of enforcing power present in
the social relation, i.e. the amount of social punishment power available as a threat in excess
of that required to maintain cooperation in the social interaction.
In order to capture the mechanism on which this denition of social capital is based,
Spagnolo (1999,[49]) provides the following description of the general case.
Consider the strategic form of each of the symmetric two-player games in Table 2, which
are innitely repeated. There are two players i and j in each stage game. Each player selects
two actions: to cooperate Ce or to defect De in the economic stage game, and to cooperate Cs
or to defect Ds in the social stage game.
The payos of the two games are described in following payo matrices:
Table 2: General Case: Two Separated Games
Economic Cooperate Ce Defect De
Cooperate Ce ce; ce be; ae
Defect De ae; be de; de
Social Cooperate Cs Defect Ds
Cooperate Cs cs; cs bs; as
Defect Ds as; bs ds; ds
In Spagnolo (1999,[49]) the two games are typical prisoner's dilemma games with symmetric
payos where the payo structure of the two games is assumed to satisfy ak > ck > dk > bk
and 2ck  ak + bk, where k = e; s: In our application, it suces to assume that ck > dk,
ak > dk > bk and 2ck  ak + bk, where k = e; s: That is, the outcome when both players
cooperate dominates the outcome if both players defect. Furthermore, if one player defects,
this reduces the other player's payo to at most dk: We refer to the resulting class of games
as generalized prisoners' dilemmas.
If the two games are independent, then the two players in the economic game do not
interact in the social game. The actions in one game are independent of those in another
game. But if the two stage games are combined, players' strategies become more complex. In
the combined stage game each player has four strategies:
fCeCs; CeDs; DeCs; DeDsg:
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There can be many types of equilibrium strategies in the innitely repeated version of the
combined game. In one particular type of equilibrium each player chooses the same actions
in both games. We focus our attention on such equilibria. In a static context such strategies
make sense. For example, the best a player can achieve through defection is obtained by
defecting simultaneously in both games. The optimal punishment against any deviation from
a cooperative equilibrium is a simultaneous interruption in both relations. Similar arguments
apply for cooperation. Hence, our analysis is only looking at the strategies fCeCs; DeDsg in
the combined stage game which have the same actions in both the economic and the social
game.
Nevertheless, in the innitely repeated game there may be many types of equilibrium
strategies that can lead to some degree of cooperation. Some of these equilibria may involve
strategies switching back and forth between cooperation and defection. For each player, the
strategy may, (essentially) state: cooperate in even periods and defect in odd periods. Some
other equilibria may have as the strategy of each player: never cooperate. We do not con-
sider such equilibria. To solve our problem, we look for an equilibrium in which each player
cooperates in every period, unless a player can gain by defecting, given the specied reaction
of the other to defection. Thus, the equilibrium that we focus on is one of the many possible
equilibria of this repeated game. We want to show that at least this particular equilibrium
supports uninterrupted cooperation.
Denition 2. Social and economic relations are (strictly) linked if the same two players
face each other in both the social game and the economic game, and only such strategies are
considered in which the players choose the same actions in both games.
Table 3: The (Strictly) Linked Stage Game
CeCs DeDs
CeCs (ce; cs); (ce; cs) (be; as); (be; as)
DeDs (ae; bs); (ae; bs) (de; ds); (de; ds)
The rst pair in the payos refers to the row player's payos in the economic and the social
game respectively, the second pair to the corresponding payos of the column player etc.
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When both players treat each game separately, cooperation in game k = e; s, i.e. the pair
of strategies (Ck; Ck); is self-enforcing if the following inequality is satised:
ck
1    ak +

1   dk:
The LHS of the inequality above is the discounted payo from the strategy: `always co-
operate in the innitely repeated game'. As this strategy will not cause the other player to
defect, the LHS is the discounted value of the payos when both player choose Ck in each stage
game. The RHS of the inequality denotes the discounted payo from the strategy: `always
defect in the innite repeated game'. As the rst defection causes the other player to defect
in all future stages of the game, it is obtained by discounting the payos of the strategy pair
(Dk; Ck) for the rst stage game and (Dk; Dk) for all subsequent stage games. Game k yields
a positive enforcing power Sk if the dierence of the LHS and the RHS of the inequality is
positive. More generally, we denote
Sk :=
(ck   ak) + (ak   dk)
1   :
In the generalized prisoner's dilemma with  2 (0; 1), Sk is an increasing function of  and ck;
and a decreasing function of ak and dk:
When the players face each other in the linked game, they consider the consequences of
their actions in both games, so cooperation in the linked game is self-enforcing if and only if
Se+Ss  0: Notice that when this condition holds, cooperation in the linked game may occur
even if cooperation in one of the separate games is not self-enforcing. For instance because
Se < 0 in the economic game. According to Spagnolo (1999,[49]), social capital is then dened
as the positive enforcing power Ss in the social game which is transferable to the economic
game when the games are linked. In Section 5, in the context of endogenous social capital, we
also consider the case in which social capital may become negative, i.e. Ss < 0:
We now proceed to use the concept of social capital in the narrower context of nancial
transactions. In our model `cooperation' for the lender means that she provides the appropriate
loan to the borrower. For the borrower `cooperation' means that he repays his debt. Similarly,
`defection' for lender means not providing the appropriate loan and for the borrower it means
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not to repay. To simplify the notation, we use S to denote the enforcing power in the social
game and call it social capital. Therefore
S := Ss =
(cs   as) + (as   ds)
1   :
The social capital S could also be interpreted as the long-run net payo from the social
game if both players choose to cooperate in each stage game rather than to defect unilaterally.
For the time being, we assume social capital is exogenous.
4. Credit Market with Exogenous Social Capital
The lender and the borrower not only face economic interaction but also interact in a social
game which may alter their payos in the overall game. For simplicity, we assume the objective
functions are linearly separable in the payos from the two relations.33 Table 4 shows the payo
matrix of the economic stage game for given loan size I.
Table 4: Economic Game with Asymmetric Payo
Economic Lender j
Loan granted Y Loan refused N
Borrower i Repay R [f(I)  (1 + r)I]; (1 + r)I 0; I
Default D f(I); 0 0; I
Borrower i and lender j are the two players in this game. The lender chooses to grant a
loan of size I or to refuse it. If she chooses N and refuses to lend, then no informal loan is
made. The borrower obtains the payo of zero and the lender obtains the safe return I. The
discounted return of the lender if she always refuses to lend in the innitely repeated game is
1
1  I. After she grants the loan, the borrower can either repay or default. When the borrower
is always granted a loan and always repays, he obtains the discounted payo E(I): If, however,
he defaults today, all lenders refuse to lend to him in the future. Hence, the borrower obtains
payo f(I) in the present stage game and zero thereafter. In each period, the two players
33This model is based on two linked innitely repeated games in the spirit of the model of multimarket contact
developed by Bernheim and Whinston, (1990,[10]). The underlying idea of multimarket contact is that `(rms
which compete against each other in many markets) may hesitate to ght local wars vigorously because the
prospects of local gain are not worth the risk of general warfare.' Bernheim and Whinston, (1990,[10], p.3).
The linkage of the two games serves to pool the incentive constraints in the two games.
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move simultaneously, choosing either to cooperate or to defect. Each seeks to maximise the
discounted sum of his or her payos over the innite repetitions of the stage game.
In this context, the borrower always chooses R if and only if
E(I)  f(I): (3)






According to the analysis in Section 2, there exists a feasibility interval [0; I^(; r)] such that
for every loan size within this interval constraint (3) is satised and the borrower will repay
in each period, given the strategy of the lender.
Following the discussion from the last section, there is a social game to consider as well.
It is assumed that the borrower is willing to embed his social behaviour while he borrows
and repays the informal loans. We formulate this situation in the following way: in the social
game, the borrower interacts with the lender in a social relation that can be represented by
a symmetric innitely repeated generalized prisoners' dilemma. The payo structure of the
social stage game is given by Table 5.
Table 5: Social Stage Game with Symmetric Payos
Social Lender j
Cs Ds
Borrower i Cs c; c b; a
Ds a; b 0; 0
The social game is a typical generalized prisoners' dilemma as introduced before. The
payo structure is assumed to satisfy c > 0; a > 0 > b and 2c  a + b. Both players always
cooperating is an equilibrium path in this innitely repeated social game whenever c1   a is
satised. Thus, the social capital equals:
S =
c
1     a =
c  (1  )a
1   : (5)
Note, however, that even if c1   a is satised, there is another equilibrium path in the social
game in which the players never cooperate.
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Table 6: (Strictly) Linked Game
Linked Lender j
Y Cs NDs
Borrower i RC ([f(I)  (1 + r)I]; c); ((1 + r)I; c) (0; b); (I; a)
DDs (f(I); a); (0; b) (0; 0); (I; 0)
The incentive constraint for the borrower to repay his loan and to cooperate in the social
relation is given by
E(I) +
c
1    f(I) + a: (6)
If c1   a, then the social capital S can facilitate cooperation in the linked game. Rearranging
(6), we obtain:
f(I)  1 + r

I   1  

S: (7)




I   1  

S:
The incentive constraint for the lender always both to lend and to cooperate incorporates






1   + a
which rearranges as
rI  a(1  )  c: (8)
Suppose social capital plays a positive role when c1   a, i.e. c   a(1   )  0; then
inequality (8) is satised as long as r  0 and I  0: Combining the incentive constraints (7)
and (8), we summarise the equilibrium credit market with exogenous social capital in Figure
3.
In the absence of social capital, the borrower is constrained in his demand for credit. At
each point in time any potential borrower faces a constraint in the form: I 2 [0; I^] where
I^  ID (see Figure 2). Here I^ is the maximum the lender is willing to lend in the absence
of social capital, whereas ID is the amount that would be borrowed if the credit constraint
did not exist. In the combined game, when the economic game and the social game are
strictly linked, the payo structure diers from that in the innitely repeated game shown in


























































































Figure 3: Credit Constraint with Exogenous Social Capital
Section 2. After introducing social capital, as illustrated in Figure 3, the line `0(I) =
1+r
 I
is shifted downwards to the line `1(I) =
1+r
 I   1  S; where the amount S of social capital
is positive. The intersection of the line `1(I) and the production function f(I) denes the
maximal incentive compatible informal loan I^ 0 under the new condition.
As indicated in Figure 3, whenever S is sucient large, the amount I^ 0 will not be less than
ID: Thus, the borrower is `unconstrained' in the credit market. This is summarised in the
following proposition.
Proposition 3. If the social capital S is large enough, then it can promote cooperation in
the economic game where the informal loan may always be granted and repaid.
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By introducing exogenous social capital, the credit constraint is ameliorated. Since we
assume the output of the project enables the borrower to repay the loan, the business environ-
ment with less constrained credit is preferable, as social capital increases the amount of credit
supplied and hence investment.
5. Credit Market with Endogenous Social Capital
In order to explore the insights concerning social capital further, we consider a simple in-
vestment problem with endogenous social capital. Assume the borrower is willing to link his
social interactions with his borrowing and repayment of informal loans. We formulate this
situation in the following way: in the social game, the borrower interacts with the lender
in a long-term social relationship that can be represented by a symmetric innitely repeated
generalized prisoner's dilemma as before. The borrower discounts the future payos with the
factor 0 <  < 1: He is assumed to have the same discount factor in the social game as in the
economic interaction.
After the borrower obtains the informal loan of size I; he spends a fraction 0 <  < 1 of the
loan, i.e. the amount I; as the economic investment for his project. Meanwhile, he spends
the rest of his loan, i.e. (1   )I; as a social investment to increase the payo of the social
game. For example, a restaurant owner who is a borrower treats a lender to a lavish banquet
which both of them enjoy.34
Assumption 4. The variable  is an exogenous variable and is given by the custom of the
country.
We assume that the social investment yields social payos if the players cooperate in the
repeated linked game. The payo in the social stage game when the borrower chooses to repay
is c(1   )I: The payo variable c in the social game is an exogenous scale factor such as
kinship or closeness. The crucial assumption in the social investment problem is that in order
to obtain positive payos in the social game, at least one of the players must invest resources
into the social relation. Therefore, social capital is costly to maintain.
34See e.g. Bian (2001,[12]).
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The social capital in this particular game is given by:
S(I; ) :=
c(1  )I   (1  )a
1   (9)
where the counterpart of the familiar assumptions for the social game hold, i.e. c(1  )I > 0;
a > 0 > b and 2c(1  )I  a+ b:
When the players face each other in the linked game, they consider the consequences of
their actions in both games. The incentive compatibility constraint for the borrower is satised
if:





t 1 [f(I)  (1 + r)I] = 1
1   [f(I)  (1 + r)I] :
This is equivalent to:
f(I)  1

[1 + r   c(1  )] I + 1  

a: (11)
The lender's participation constraint if the two games are strictly linked is:
1 + r
1   I +
c(1  )
1   I 
I
1   + a: (12)
Rearranging inequality (12), we obtain:
I  a(1  )
r + c(1  ) : (13)
The loan contract is self-enforcing if and only if both inequalities (11) and (13), i.e. the incen-
tive constraint for the borrower and the participation constraint of the lender, are satised.
Now we turn to the equilibrium in the credit market. We focus on the equilibrium strategies
that the borrower and the lender consider in the repeated game which prescribes the `same'
actions in the economic and the social game. They cooperate in every period, unless there
is a prot from ending cooperation or the other ended the cooperation rst. To obtain the
outcome that is optimal from his perspective, the borrower solves the following optimization
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Subject to




r + c(1  ) (15)
f(I)  (1 + r)I (16)
where M := 1 + r   c(1  ) and N := (1  )a.
This decision problem can be understood as follows.
As before, we assume the borrower's objective function is linearly separable in the payos
from the two relations:
[f(I)  (1 + r)I] + [c(1  )I]:
Rearranging and simplifying it, the borrower's objective functions is written as
f(I) M  I:
Constraint (14), deduced from inequality (11), is the incentive compatibility constraint for
the borrower to ensure that he repays in each stage game. Constraint (15), deduced from
inequality (13), denes the participation constraint for the lender. It indicates she is willing to
grant a loan of size I to the borrower in each period. Constraint (16) states that the income
generated by the project is sucient to repay the informal loan.
One constraint that does not occur in this decision problem is
I  N
c(1  ) ; (17)
which denotes that social capital is non-negative. There are two reasons not to impose this
constraint. Firstly, even if social capital is negative and the economic interaction can be
`unlinked' from social interaction, the borrower may be worst o by doing so. Unlinking would
loosen the credit constraint and thus allow him to borrow more, but it would also remove his
payo from the social interaction. Secondly, it seems plausible that it may be dicult to unlink
economic and social interaction in the context of informal loans. If the loan is granted by a
lender who already has a social relation with the borrower, it may go against local custom not
to provide the investment in social capital. Furthermore, the borrower may have diculties
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nding a lender with whom he does not have a social relationship that is willing to provide
an informal loan. Such lender would typically lack the information that allows her to make
a founded decision about granting the loan, as the credible transmission of such information





































   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   












Figure 4: Credit Constraint with Endogenous Social Capital for M > 0




[M  I  N ]:
The incentive constraint of the borrower is satised with equality where the straight line `2(I)
intersects the concave production function f(I): Similarly, denote
`3(I) := [r + c(1  )]  I  N:
The participation constraint of the lender is satised whenever `3(I)  0: In Figure 4, eI denotes
the minimal loan size for which the participation constraint of the lender holds, I denotes the
smallest incentive compatible loan size and I denotes the largest incentive compatible loan size.
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The slope of the iso-payo line is M; whereas the slope of `2(I) equals
M
 : Since 0 <  < 1;
the iso-payo line is atter than the line `2(I):
Proposition 5. Let ID(r; ; ) denote the optimal unconstrained loan size in the presence
of endogenous social capital. Let M be as before. The optimal constrained loan size in the
presence of endogenous social capital now is
 For M > 0 :
I(r; ; ) :=
8<:
eI if ID(r; ; ) < eI
ID(r; ; ) if eI  ID(r; ; )  I
I if ID(r; ; ) > I;
provided that there exists a loan size that satises both the incentive compatibility for
repayment and the participation constraint of the lender, i.e. I is well dened and I > eI:
Otherwise
I(r; ; ) := 0:
 For M  0 :




I; eIo  Imax
0 otherwise.
where Imax denotes the maximal loan size for which repayment is possible.
Proof: See Appendix.
Proposition 5 distinguishes two cases, M > 0 and M  0: The rst case occurs when the
marginal cost of repayment of the informal loan, (1+ r); exceeds the marginal benet that the
borrower derives from the resulting increase in social capital, c(1  ): The potential outcomes
are loan sizes I that satisfy both the incentive constraint for repayment and the participation
constraint of the lender, i.e. eI  I  I:35 If eI exceeds I there is no loan the lender would be
willing to grant, as her participation constraint and/or the incentive constraint for repayment is
violated. If, however, eI  I; then some loan I with eI  I  I will be applied for and granted.
The loan size I is the value in this interval that is closest to the optimal unconstrained loan
size in the presence of endogenous social capital. This situation is depicted in Figure 4.
35Note that eI is never smaller than I:



























































Figure 5: Credit Constraint with Endogenous Social Capital for M  0
The second case in Proposition 5, M  0; occurs when the marginal cost of repayment
of the informal loan is less than or equal to the marginal benet for the borrower from the
resulting increase in social capital. Now the borrower applies for and obtains the largest loan
he can repay, Imax; whenever it satises both the participation constraint of the lender and
the incentive constraint for repayment. This is illustrated in Figure 5. If at least one of these
constraints is violated no loan will be granted, i.e. I = 0:
In interactions between borrowers and lenders, oering credit requires a level of security
that can be based on legal measures, trust or coercion. Small-scale producers and traders
in less developed countries have limited access to legal measures and therefore have to rely
on other safeguards, notably trust and reputation. For a given country at a give time, there
may exist an `appropriate' level of social capital. Our results illustrate that social capital,
as determined by a range of parameters, such as a; c; and , may have an important impact
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on the level of investment. Some levels of social capital may promote loans that otherwise
would not be granted. Thus, our model suggests that because of the presence of social capital,
some emerging economies such as China have managed to grow despite the absence of many
conventional institutions like the rule of law. It also indicates that even in the presence of
informal credit there may be a role for formal institutions that provide micro-nance, as some
loans may be too small to be granted.
It should be noted that the optimal level of , which we assumed to be exogenously given,
can be determined endogenously in a similar way as the optimal level of investment I. In this
case, the extent of the credit market is limited by several parameters both from the economic
and the social interaction, i.e. a; c; r;  and I, for which cooperation could remain self-enforcing.
6. Concluding Remarks
In this paper we considered the problem of enforcing informal loans and the attendant pos-
sibility of the voluntary default. Loan contracts in the informal sector are rarely explicitly
recorded and enforced by formal legal institutions. Repayment may be facilitated partially
through informal enforcement mechanisms, such as social sanctions in linked relations in re-
peated interactions. In large part, compliance is ensured by the threat of reduction or elimi-
nation of access to credit in the future. The natural model to study the enforcement problem
is one of repeated interactions in the credit market, which is described in Section 2.
The essential question is to what extent access to credit is a binding constraint on house-
holds' productive activities. Those borrowers who desire more credit and the non-borrowers
who could, against their wishes, not obtain credit, are credit constrained. We explore this issue
from dierent perspectives. Firstly, we analyse a model of a credit market without considering
social capital, and nd that in equilibrium credit constraints may arises.
Secondly, we show that the same framework can be adapted to understand more realistic
markets taking social capital into account. Following Spagnolo (1999,[49]), we dene social
capital as the slack of enforcing power present in the social relation. This is the amount
of credible social punishment power available as a threat in excess of the amount required
to maintain cooperation in the social interaction. We start by considering the amount of
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social capital to be exogenously given. In this case, the credit constraint may disappear if
the social capital exceeds some cut-o value. The most extreme examples can be found in
hierarchically structured extended family settings, in which a patriarch (or `godfather') holds
an extraordinarily large set of obligations on the part of other people that he can call in as
and when necessary. The analogy to nancial capital is direct. We then proceed to endogenize
social capital by introducing the possibility of investing in social capital. In this case some
borrowers will nd that only excessive loans are granted by the lender.
Our analysis emphasizes the importance of self-enforcing contracts in the informal credit
market. It must be noted that our analysis does not imply that formal third-party enforcement
is unimportant. In the model, social capital works only imperfectly in dealing with the prob-
lem of weak contract enforcement when the mobility of borrowers is high. Nevertheless, our
research indicates how informal governance can function as a stepping-stone toward ecient
formal institutions. In the long run, it seems essential for emerging market economies such as
China to develop their formal contract enforcement systems and enhance the rule of law. This
improves transactional eciencies and fosters the growth of the private sector.
Even though some empirical studies show that the relationship between social capital and
economic performance is ambiguous,36 our analysis focuses on its positive eects in order to
understand the successful private business sector and its credit arrangements. Such arrange-
ments involve a combination of social obligation, good-will, and trust among the participants.
In communities with high levels of social capital, people may trust each other more because the
community's networks provide better opportunities to punish deviants.37 At the same time,
in these communities people may rely more on others keeping their promises as a result of a
moral attitude inculcated with education.38 The key idea behind the enhancing eects of social
capital in this paper is that it may positively aect the repayment incentive of borrowers, and
consequently, tend to mitigate or even solve their credit constraint problem.39 This has some
important implications for a number of aspects concerning the design of development policy.
36See e.g. Durlauf (1999,[21]) and Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2004,[33]).
37See also Coleman (1990,[16]) and Spagnolo (1999,[49]).
38See Baneld (1958,[8]) and Coleman (1999,[17]).
39The only exception are small loans, which may be too small to be granted when social capital is endogenous.
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Loan may, however, be too small to be granted, wenn social capital is endogenous. Therefore,
our model is not at odds with the strong demand for micro-nance in rural areas where social
ties are strong and borrowers are immobile.
One further extension of the model is worth commenting on. We could relax the assumption
that the borrower cannot use his accumulated savings from previous successful projects. On
the one hand, in the stage game, this would introduce correlated default with considerations
of the possibility of self-nancing. Under relational lending, the borrowers become less likely
to have sucient incentives to repay. Therefore, the lender will increase the interest rate by
charging a risk premium. The interest rate may become too high to sustain an informal credit
market. In an environment which is characterized by a high level of physical, economic, and
political uncertainty, the discount factor in the economic game is low because the realisation
of future benets may be considered unlikely. Cooperation in both games, based on the longer
time horizon of personal relationships, however, could still be obtained when the discount
factor in the social game is suciently high. Hence, both extending the literature on credit
cooperatives and taking account of dierent discount factors in dierent types of games could
be a fruitful further development.
Note that although this mechanism, that social capital has enhancing eects on repayment
incentives, may work in China,40 it may not be eective in other countries. Wydick (1999,[57])
nds that improvements in repayment rates are associated with variables that represent the
ability to monitor and enforce group relationships, such as knowledge of the weekly sales of
fellow group members in western Guatemala. He nds little impact, though, of social ties per
se: friends do not make more reliable group members than others. In fact, group members
are sometimes softer on their friends, worsening average repayment rates. Wenner (1995,[56])
investigates repayment rates in 25 village banks in Costa Rica and nds active screening that
successfully excludes the worst credit risks. Hence, providing a more comprehensive analysis
of the dierences between the two lending schemes which rely on dierent mechanisms is a
promising subject for further research.
40See e.g. Allen, Qian and Qian (2002,[3]), Batjargal and Liu (2002,[9]), Xin and Pearce (1996,[58]) and
Yeung and Tung (1996,[59]).
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1:




Since (I; r) is strictly concave in I; for each interest rate r  0 there is a unique solution
ID(r) that satises the F.O.C.
f 0(ID) = 1 + r:
The credit constraint is obtained from the inequality
f(I)  1 + r

I;





Denote by ^(r) the discount factor for which the unique optimal unconstrained demand for
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For any  < ^(r) the inequality
f(ID)  1 + r

ID
is violated, as the RHS increases, while the LHS remains constant. Therefore, the borrower
faces a binding credit constraint for any  < ^(r):
For any  > ^(r) the borrower faces no credit constraint by similar reasoning.
End of Proof.
Proof of Proposition 5:
In order to solve the optimization problem of the borrower in the stage game in Section 5,
we start by considering the feasible interval dened by the constraints (14) and (15). There
are two cases to be considered.
 Case I When M > 0:
This case holds when (1 + r) > c(1  ): This seems to be the `normal' situation.
When M > 0, there are three potential sub-cases to consider:
Ia) two intersections.
In this sub-case, sinceM > 0, the line `2(I) has a positive slope. Dene 	 (I) = f (I) `2(I):
The solutions for 	 (I) = 0 are I and I with I< I.
Therefore, we obtain an interval for I from constraint (14): [I; I]: For each loan size in this
interval, the borrower benets from making the loan, as the slope M of the iso-payo line is
smaller than the slope M of the line `2(I):
We also obtain an interval for I from constraint (15): [eI;1): We discuss under which
conditions the interval [I; I] and the interval [eI;1) have a non-empty intersection. This
intersection is the feasible interval dened by the constraints (14) and (15).
If I < eI, then there is no interval for I dened by constraints (14) and (15).41 Thus, the
lender would not grant any loan, i.e. I(r; ; ) := 0:
Otherwise, the feasible interval for I dened by constraints (14) and (15) is:
[maxfI; eIg; I]:
41As can be seen in Figure 4; for  suciently close to zero the inequalities (14) and (15) form a contradiction
and this case occurs.
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The unconstrained demand for credit ID(r; ; ) in the presence of endogenous social capital
exceeds I; as the slope M of `2(I) exceeds the slope M of the iso-payo line. For the optimal
constrained loan size we obtain:
I(r; ; ) :=
8<:
eI if ID(r; ; ) < eI
ID(r; ; ) if ID(r; ; ) 2 [eI; I]
I if ID(r; ; ) > I:
Ib) one intersection.
As N  0 and f 0(1) = 0, this case can only occur when `2(I) is tangent to f (I) ; in which
case the reasoning of case Ia) applies.
Ic) no intersections.
In this sub-case, it is possible that there is no intersection by f (I) and `2(I). The latter line
always lies above the former curve and the lender would not grant any loan.
 Case II When M 5 0:
This case occurs when (1+ r)  c(1  ). There is no limit to the size of the loan that the
borrower would be willing to take and constraint (16), that repayment is possible, comes to
bear. Denote the maximum loan size for which repayment is possible by Imax:
In this case there is one intersection of f (I) and `2(I); i.e. 	
 1 (0) = I: Thus, the
feasible interval for I from constraint (14) is [I;1). In addition, we obtain an interval for I
from constraints (15) and (16) as [eI; Imax]. Therefore, the feasible interval for I as dened
by constraints (14), (15) and (16) is: [max
n
I; eIo ; Imax]: If this interval is empty, the lender
would not grant any loan, i.e. I(r; ; ) := 0:
From this we obtain




I; eIo  Imax:
0 otherwise.
End of proof.
